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Overturning the social contract?
Simon Connell, the University of Otago
asks what the legislative reversal of Davies means
T
he Sentencing Amendment Act 2014 received assent
on 6 June 2014 and will come into force six months
after that date. The Act, which implements a number
of the government’s reforms concerning victims of crime, is
one of a number of Acts that formerly comprised the Victims
of Crime Reform Bill.
The particular reform that I wish to address is the reversal
of the Supreme Court decision Davies v Police [2009] NZSC
47, [2009] 3 NZLR 189. I have touched on this issue before
(“Justice for Victims of Injury” (2012) 25 NZULR 181 at
197–8 and 205–206), and the overturning of Davies is an
opportunity to revisit the issue. A legislative reversal of a
Supreme Court decision suggests some kind of difference of
view between that Court and legislators. The reasoning of a
majority in the Supreme Court was based on the idea of the
accident compensation (ACC) scheme as a “social contract”,
raising a question of whether the case’s reversal, in effect,
overturns the ACC social contract.
TOPPING-UP ACC ENTITLEMENTS
The question of law in Davies is relatively straight-forward:
can a sentence of reparation top-up entitlement to compen-
sation for lost earnings paid under the ACC scheme? Repa-
ration is a payment from offender to victim and, in contrast
to a fine, is compensatory (Police v Ferrier HC Auckland
CRI-2003-404-195, 18 November 2003).
The facts are also uncomplicated. Davies was towing a
trailer with an insecurely attached mattress. The mattress fell
off, causing a collision in which a cyclist was injured. The
injuries were serious enough for the cyclist to need some time
off work. The cyclist received cover for the injury under the
ACC scheme and was paid entitlements including weekly
compensation for lost earnings. ACC weekly compensation
is limited to 80 per cent of lost earnings, leaving a shortfall of
20 per cent. Davies was convicted of careless driving causing
injury and the District Court ordered him to pay $20,500
reparation to the victim. That reparation included $11,555
for the shortfall of lost earnings ACC provided no compen-
sation for, thereby “topping-up” the cyclist’s compensation
from 80 per cent to 100 per cent.
The question is one of statutory interpretation. Sec-
tion 32(5) of the Sentencing Act 2002 states that a court must
not order reparation:
in respect of any consequential loss or damage … for
which the court believes that a person has entitlements
under the Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation and Compen-
sation Act 2001.
“Consequential loss or damage … for which … a person has
entitlements” could refer to a type of loss (for example “lost
earnings”) for which a person has entitlement. Alternatively,
it could refer to an actual loss for which a person has received
an actual payment. If the former, the cyclist already had an
entitlement to compensation for lost earnings under the ACC
scheme, so Davies could not be ordered to provide reparation
for the same type of loss. If the latter, the cyclist’s entitlement
only extended to the 80 per cent of lost earnings that the
ACC scheme would pay for. That is, the cyclist had no
entitlement under the ACC scheme to the remaining 20 per
cent, meaning there was no barrier to an order that Davies
provide compensation for that shortfall.
THE LOWER COURTS
Davies appealed the District Court’s topping-up of ACC
entitlements by reparation on the basis that it was barred by
s 32(5). In two short decisions (of around 30 paragraphs
each) the High Court and Court of Appeal had little difficulty
in endorsing the topping-up (Police v Davies (2007) 8 NZELC
98.691 (HC) and [2008] 2 NZLR 645 (CA).) Wilson J, for
the Court of Appeal, noted that:
s 7(1)(d) of the Sentencing Act provides that one of the
purposes of sentencing is “to provide reparation for harm
done by the offending”. That purpose could not be achieved
if a court were unable to order reparation for that part of
a victim’s lost earnings which are not compensable under
the [Accident] Compensation Act.
THE SUPREME COURT
A majority of the Supreme Court (Elias CJ, and Blanchard,
Anderson and Tipping JJ) disagreed. Key to this decision was
the idea of the ACC scheme as a “social contract”. The
“social contract” explanation of the introduction of New
Zealand’s no-fault accident compensation scheme is as fol-
lows: the people of New Zealand, mindful of the inconsistent
outcomes provided by a fault-based system of accident com-
pensation, exchanged their right to sue a wrongdoer for full
compensation for personal injury for the right to receive fair
compensation under a no-fault scheme. Elias CJ, giving the
judgment for herself and Blanchard and Anderson JJ, stated
at [18] that the decision to pay only 80 per cent of lost
earnings had to be considered in the context of the decision
to pay fair, rather than full, compensation.
The loss of the right to sue for personal injury is expressed
in s 317 of the Accident Compensation Act 2001, which bars
proceedings for damages arising directly or indirectly out of
personal injury covered by the ACC scheme. A sentence of
reparation, though compensatory, is not proceedings for
damages, so is not barred by s 317. However, Elias CJ stated
at [27] that s 317 was a pivotal provision in the social
contract implemented through the ACC legislation and an
important consideration for interpreting s 32(5) of the Sen-
tencing Act. She noted at [28] that allowing top-ups of ACC
entitlements by reparation would “revive” the ability to
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obtain compensation from wrongdoers for victims of crime,
but not victims of civil wrong, and stated that there was no
clear justification for that position.
Tipping J picked up on that same point in his concurring
judgment, stating at [48] that:
It would go against the whole philosophy and purpose of
the accident compensation scheme to allow those suffer-
ing injury as a result of an offence to have the potential to
gain greater compensation than those suffering the same
injury when no offence is involved or no one is prosecuted.
McGrath J dissented. His view, summarised at [81], was that
allowing reparation to top-up ACC entitlements was incon-
sistent with some of the policies underlying the accident
compensation legislation: the principle that one cannot claim
compensation based on fault and the incentive for rehabili-
tation provided by paying an injury victim less than full
compensation for lost earnings. In contrast with Tipping J’s
strong language (“against the whole philosophy and purpose
of the [ACC] scheme”), McGrath thought that these mere
clashes with aspects of the scheme should not be over-stated.
Instead, McGrath J thought that they should be set aside in
light of the clear imperative set out in the Sentencing Act to
provide for the interests of victims of crime.
LEGISLATIVE REVERSAL
The Supreme Court decision was dated 25 May 2009. Early
the following year, then Justice Minister, the Hon Simon
Power MP, announced an intention to overturn the decision
(“Reparation and ACC entitlements”, press release, 28 Janu-
ary 2010.) This intention manifested itself in the Victims of
Crime Reform Bill, introduced on 16 August 2011. The
Explanatory Note to the Bill specifically referred to the
“overturn” of Davies. The Bill had its first reading on
4 October 2011 and second reading on 6 March 2014. The
Bill was divided by committee of the whole House, with the
part relating to Davies becoming part of the Sentencing
Amendment Act 2014. Section 6 of the Act, when it comes
into force, amends s 32(5) of the Sentencing Act to state that
a court must not order reparation:
in respect of any consequential loss or damage … for
which compensation has been, or is to be, paid under the
Accident Compensation Act 2001.
That s 6 overturns Davies could have been made clearer. The
new wording is susceptible to the same two readings as the
old: “loss or damage … for which compensation has been, or
will be paid” could refer to a type of loss for which compen-
sation has been, or will be, paid or it could refer to the actual
loss. If I have lost $100 of earnings and been paid $80 by
ACC, then it can be said that I have been paid compensation
for my lost earnings. However, it can also be said that I have
not been compensated for the $20 shortfall.
I suggest that the latter reading (which overturns Davies)
is correct, for the following reasons. First, the wording has
been carried over from the Victims of Crime Reform Bill, the
Explanatory Note for which specifically referred to the over-
turn of Davies. Second, although there might be some merit
to merely clarifying the Sentencing Act for it is more likely
that Parliament’s intent was to change the law.
Finally, the shift in language from a focus on whether
someone has entitlements to whether someone has been paid
is more consistent with the latter reading. This is also reflected
in s 7 of the Amendment Act, which amends s 33 of the
Sentencing Act. That section currently allows a court to
order a reparation report on:
the extent to which the person who suffered the loss or
damage is likely to be covered by entitlements under the
Accident Compensation Act 2001
The amended section instead allows for a report on:
the amount or extent of compensation paid or payable
under the Accident Compensation Act 2001 to the person
who suffered the loss or damage in respect of that loss or
damage
This unclear drafting is not ideal: we should not need to turn
to Parliamentary materials or other parts of the legislation to
shed light on an ambiguity. The section could have barred the
award of reparation:
in respect of the proportion of any consequential loss or
damage … for which compensation has been, or is to be,
paid under the Accident Compensation Act 2001.
The following analysis proceeds on the assumption that this
interpretation is correct.
EXAMINING THE CLASH
The overturning of Davies puts the majority of the Supreme
Court at odds with the legislature (as well as the lower
courts.) At the heart of the issue here is a clash between the
majority’s “social contract” account of the ACC scheme and
the idea that an offender is responsible for putting right losses
caused to a victim.
For the majority in the Supreme Court, this clash had
already been resolved back in 1974 by the implementation of
the ACC Scheme in the first place: full compensation for
some gave way to fair compensation for all. Despite arising
as a question about the interpretation of the Sentencing
Act 2002, the issue in Davies had effectively already been
decided.
In contrast, the lower courts, McGrath J in the Supreme
Court, and the legislature, put corrective justice for victims of
crime first. How are we to understand this schism?
One possible explanation for the split between the Supreme
Court and the lower courts is that the latter were overly
concerned with providing better outcomes to the victim of
Davies’ offending and somehow overlooked the philosophy
of the scheme. This does not seem plausible, and in any case
the same cannot be said for Parliament, who had full access
to the majority’s reasoning and, nevertheless, made a con-
scious decision to overturn the case.
The reversal of Davies could therefore be seen as an
overturning of the “social contract” philosophy of ACC.
Allowing reparation to top-up ACC entitlements means that
victims of injury who also happen to be victims of crime (and
happen to be victims of an offender with deep enough
pockets to pay reparation) are better off than other victims of
injury. Inconsistent treatment of victims of injury is one of
the reasons we have the ACC scheme in the first place — but
that is something of an oversimplification.
There is an important difference between the pre- and
post- ACC compensation landscape. The ACC Scheme pro-
vides a baseline level of compensation for all victims of
injury. A distribution where everyone receives fair compen-
sation, and some full, is surely not as dire as a distribution
where a few receive full compensation, many receive meager
compensation, and some receive none at all. Perhaps McGrath J
is right that topping-up ACC entitlements is not so bad after
all. Indeed, the courts have decided that victims of injury are
Continued on page 320
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Continued from page 315
not barred from seeking exemplary damages (Donselaar
v Donselaar [1982] 1 NZLR 81 (CA), affirmed in Couch
v Attorney-General [2010] NZSC 27, [2010] 3 NZLR 149)
even though exemplary damages mean a minority of victims
of injury can receive additional payments.
A further point to consider is that the Royal Commission
whose Report led to the ACC scheme did not criticise only
the outcomes produced by negligence actions for personal
injury. The Commission also argued that the “fault prin-
ciple” philosophy of negligence was “illogical”, stating that
“it is really not possible to equate negligence as an indepen-
dent tort with moral blameworthiness” (Compensation for
personal injury in New Zealand: Report of the Royal Com-
mission of Inquiry (1967) at 47–51). That is, the tort of
negligence did not have sufficient moral backing to justify
making the negligent tortfeasor pay compensation. Setting
aside the validity of that argument, we must consider the
matter afresh if we are instead talking about making criminal
wrongdoers pay. Breaches of the criminal law might have a
better claim to moral blameworthiness than civil acts of
negligence, and proof of wrongdoing beyond reasonable
doubt is required for a conviction. This could provide a
justification for different treatment of civil and criminal
wrongdoing that Elias CJ thought was lacking.
CONCLUSION
Davies is a breach of the ACC social contract, but only if we
adopt the strong “social contract” account of the majority of
the Supreme Court. A more relaxed conception of the phi-
losophy of the ACC scheme, one which allows for some
inconsistent outcomes between victims of injury as long as all
receive adequate compensation, could account both for the
overturning of Davies and the availability of exemplary
damages for victims of injury.
The idea of the ACC social contract is a kind of origin
myth — a sort of fairy tale to tell Torts students. Like most
origin myths, it contains a grain of truth but should not be
taken too seriously. The enactment of the ACC Scheme
clearly involved political bargaining: for example, the lobby-
ing by various groups, particularly unions, to include lump
sum payments despite the Royal Commission’s recommen-
dation in favour of periodic payments. The passage of all but
the most mundane of Bills results in some lobbying, yet we do
not often elevate the result of the process to a “social con-
tract”.
The idea that the scheme is an exchange for the right to
sue implies that there is some worth and validity in the right
to sue in the first place — otherwise, how could it be
reasonable to demand something in exchange for giving it
up? The Royal Commission, however, seems to have seen
little merit in negligence actions for personal injury, and, I
would suggest, saw their proposal as an outright replace-
ment, rather than some kind of trade-in.
A further reason not to treat the scheme seriously as a
“contract” is that the state has made a series of unilateral
changes its scope — an action not normally available to a
contracting party. The Accident Compensation Rehabilita-
tion and Insurance Act 1992 made the scheme considerably
less generous (some might even say it did not meet the ideal of
“fair” compensation.) The Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation
and Compensation Act 2001, despite referring to reinforcing
the social contract in its “purpose” section (s 3), retained a
number of the 1992 retrenchments.
With respect, the majority of the Supreme Court in Davies
erred in taking the “social contract’ account of the ACC
scheme too seriously. The legislative reversal of Davies thus is
not the overturning of a genuine “social contract” that ought
to be protected by the law. It is a reminder that the ACC
Scheme exists at the nexus of a number of different compet-
ing policy objectives, and that courts should not put one of
those policies ahead of the others based on a “social con-
tract” which is, upon close examination, illusory. ❒
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